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1DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 20/12/2013 Accident number: 799
Accident time: 22:30 Accident Date: 13/08/2010
Where it occurred: Al Lafa MF, Kassala Country: Sudan
Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)
Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 05/10/2010
ID original source: 2-10/03 Name of source: UNMAO
Organisation: [Demining group]
Mine/device: PRB M35 AP blast Ground condition: agricultural (recent)
Date record created: Date last modified: 20/12/2013
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2
Map details
Map east: E362908.9 Map north: N151254.6
Accident Notes
inadequate metal-detector (?)
inadequate training (?)
mechanical detonation (?)
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?)
protective equipment not worn (?)
Accident report
A report of this accident was made available as a PDF file in 2013. It’s conversion into a
document file has led to some of the formatting being lost. It is reproduced below, edited for
anonymity. The Annexes referenced in the file were not made available, but a report on the
management failings of the Demining Group involved was included and is reproduced under
“Related papers”. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial.
BOI Report
Executive Summary
1. The accident occurred in (NR 205) on the 13th August 2010 in a cleared mine field (?) in Al
Lafa Kassala where a tractor driver was injured by an Anti-Tank (AT) PRB 35 mine whilst
cultivating an area of land that had been released through full manual clearance by [Demining
group]. The tractor driver suffered injuries to his upper and lower right limbs.
22. In accordance with NTSGs, the Director of UNMAO-Sudan issued a written convening
Order on the 03 October 2010 for a mine accident BOI. The BOI members were: Chairman:
[Name removed] BEM UNMAO, MR [Name removed] NMAC. MR [Name removed] UNMAO,
MR [Name removed] [2nd Demining group], MR [Name removed] [Demining group].
3. The BOI sat, and conducted all proceedings in Kassala with the exception a of a site visit,
and concluded from the available information that:
[Demining group] had missed the AT mine PRB 35 that was detonated by the tractor and the
two other AT PRB 35 mines located after the accident by the military engineers. Information
from the site during the current re-clearance of the DA, has uncovered one more AT PRB 35
mine and one more PBR 35 AP mine. The mines found after the accident should have been
detected and cleared during the initial Clearance.
As per the Implementation Plan (IP) [Demining group] were conducting full manual clearance
of the site using Minelab F3 detectors, these detectors were trialed and were found to detect
both AP and AT PRB 35 mines to the required clearance depth.
SOPs of the organization involved in this accident need to be reviewed in relation to Internal
QA on site documentation, Accident Report writing, and actions to be taken whilst
investigating explosion.
There was insufficient internal and external QA visits conducted on the site through out the
clearance process.
4. Recommendations of the board are:
4.1 [Demining group] Greater supervision and/or training are provided to ensure that the basic
levels of record-keeping and completion documentation are maintained in accordance with
NTSGs in the future. The relevant documents should be able to relate to task/ground to the
reader; it should be possible to accurately cross-reference data.
4.2 The following documentation is added to the [Demining group] SOPs: Visitors Log,
Detector running log, Stores & Equipment Register, Central Demolition Site (CDS) Standing
Orders, Demolition Plans & Demolition Safety Briefs if utilizing a CDS.
4.3 Internal training should be conducted with all team leaders TFMs in the arts of finishing
Completion Reports as laid out in the NTSGs Sudan.
4.4 Missed mines drills to be increased to a five metre box around any area where a mine is
not found in a mine row. [Demining group] SOPS to be amended and NTSG to be amended
to reflect the miss mine drill.
4.5 To comply with NTSGs, Internal QA should be conducted by the de-mining agency, which
must submit the required number of QA forms relevant to the task once a month.
4.6. [Demining group] reverts to completing the UNMAO daily report not the weekly progress
report.
4.7. (NMAC UNMAO Offices Kassala) should carry out a review of all QA practices. If training
is needed, support should be given.
4.8. The Kassala UNMAO sub-office should carry out a review of all contractors on site task
documentation in relation to quality of recording.
4.9 Kassala Operations Officer to assist QA by conducting external QA which he currently
does not do, and to take a more active approach in the events that are unfolding in the Area
of Operation.
34.10. NRMAO to issue an immediate safety notice to all contractors and sub office’s on the
requirements of creating a safe working lane to sites where accidents or detonations have
taken place before any movement is allowed in the area.
4.11. The detector trial conducted on the Mine lab F3 and the Ebinger 421 GC (Annex J) have
high lighted that the Ebinger 421 GC will not detect PRB35 AT mine at the required clearance
depth. All companies must be warned and a review taken by HQ UNMAO in relation to
allowing this detector to be used in country against these mines.
1. Introduction
1.1 An accident occurred in Al Lafa, Kassala on 13th August 2010. A tractor driver was
injured whilst cultivating a portion of land using a tractor in preparation for planting. The
Sudanese Red Crescent notified the Kassala sub-office the next day about the details
surrounding the admittance of the tractor driver to the teaching hospital in Kassala.
1.2 On 14th August 2010, Quality Assurance (QA) Officer [Name removed 1] was the officer
in charge of the sub office, as the Operations officer (Ops) [Name removed] was on Leave,
[Name removed 1] sent an email informing the Regional office and Headquarters office that
an accident had taken place in the AI Lafa area. On the 15th August 2010, [Name removed 1]
then arranged for National Operations Assistant [Name removed] and the QA assistant from
the sub-office along with members of the Kassala NMAC office to visit the site and to
complete a Dangerous Area (DA) mine field accident report and a victim report. This was
based on information from the sub office national QA Officer who stated that the accident site
was out side the [Demining group] cleared area. By this time the local military engineer’s had
visited the site and found two other AT PRB 35 mines close to the tractor. They marked
around the site with local bushes to warn other people of the hazard. [Name removed 1]
returned to Damazin on the same morning. QA Officer [Name removed] then arrived at
Kassala and took over as Officer-In-Charge of the Kassala UNMAO sub-office.
1.3 On the 16 August 2010 the mine field, DA and victim reports were sent to the Northern
Region Mine Action Office (NRMAO). The first reports from the national QA officer in Kassala
indicated that the accident site was 300 mtrs outside the [Demining group] cleared area. This
information led the regional office to thinking this was a new DA. During this period the
Regional Coordinator was on leave, the reports stayed with the NRMAO office until the 23
August 2010. The Regional Operations Coordinator, [Name removed], sent an email to
[Name removed] and [Name removed] (International Operations Officer who by this time had
returned from leave) stating that the information within the DA report was insufficient. He
further requested that the sub-office provide more details. On the same day, [Name removed]
confirmed receiving the email.
1.4 On the 30 August 2010, the revised DA report was sent back to NRMAO. A new DA
number was generated, NR 895. [Another Demining Group] was chosen by Regional office to
conduct a GMAA on the site, based on their availability. [This Demining group] was currently
working on a different site and were only able to be tasked on the 16 September 2010.
1.5 On the 16 September 2010, [the Other Demining Group] was tasked to conduct a GMAA
task on the reported accident site. During the mapping stage of the site, [the Other Demining
Group] found that their records showed that the accident site was within the area that
[Demining group] had cleared. [The Other Demining Group] reported this to the sub- office.
NRMAO and the sub-office decided that a mapping exercise would be held to decide whether
the accident site was or was not inside an area recorded as cleared.
1.6 A joint meeting was held in the Kassala sub-office on the 26 September 2010 between
representatives from UNMAO, NMAC, and [Demining group]. The meeting was to try and
4determine whether or not the accident site was indeed inside a [Demining group] cleared
area. The meeting looked into the sub office databases and checked the details against maps
and records of the site held in the sub office. The final outcome could not determine whether
the accident definitely occurred inside an area that [Demining group] had cleared. NRMAO
then checked the accident coordinates with the completion maps from the survey team [Name
removed].
1.7 On the afternoon of 26 September 2010, NRMAO requested [Demining group] to conduct
a detailed joint investigation into the accident site to confirm or not whether the accident took
place inside an area that [Demining group] had cleared.
1.8 On the 28 September a joint team from [Demining group], NMAC, UNMAO visited the site
and confirmed that the accident was indeed inside their area that had been released.
[Demining group] then produced a detail accident investigation report and forwarded it to
Regional office for their attention. [This was not made available.]
1.9 . Upon receipt of the accident report from [Demining group], UNMAO HQ issued a
convening order for a Board of Inquiry (BOI).
1.10. In accordance with the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSG), the
Programme Manager of UNMAO-Sudan issued a written convening order on 3 October 2010
for a Demining Incident Board of Inquiry (BOI) to explore the findings of the preliminary
investigation. (See Annex A)
1.11 The Board members are:
[Five names removed.]
1.12 The entire Board convened in Kassala Sub Office on the 4th, 5th, 6th October 2010. On
the 7th of October, [name removed] returned to Khartoum. The remaining members met in
the afternoon of the 13th of October to review the findings of the report.
2. Accident details
2.1 Mr [Name removed] a local farmer was cultivating his land with his tractor during the day
and the hours of darkness on the 13 August 2010. This is a normal practice in the Kassala
area as the day time temperatures often soar into the mid forties. The land he was cultivating
had been subjected to a GMAA Survey and a clearance operation by [Demining group]
between March 2009 and July 2009. A DA report created by the sub office on 26 August 2010
after the accident indicates that the land had been cultivated once before without any
incidents.
2.2 At around 2230hrs on the evening of the 13 August 2010, a large explosion was heard
from a local police station near the accident site. An officer from the station went to the area
to find the damaged tractor and the driver, who had suffered injuries to his right upper arm
and right leg.
2.3 A report was sent to the Military Intelligence office in Kassala at around 2300hrs stating
that a farmer had been injured and that the police were evacuating him to the teaching
hospital in Kassala.
2.4 The next morning, on 14 August 2010, an intelligence officer from the Kassala military,
along with the police officer visited the site of the explosion. They observed that there was an
unexploded mine lying close to the scene of the accident. Therefore, the military engineers
from Kassala were called and arrived on site around 1000hrs.
2.5 The engineers searched around the site on the 14/15 October and they visually located
one (AT PRB 35) mine lying on its side in a furrow that had been created by the action of the
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a second (AT PRB 35) mine. Both mines were removed and destroyed.
2.6 The military engineer conducting the search indicated that given the depth of the crater
where the mine exploded, they estimated that the mine was approximately 30 cms (this was
only an estimation as others have estimated the depth to be between 18 -25cm deep: it
should by noted that NTSGs Chapter 4 Par 2.18 states that the min clearance depth is 13 cm)
from the surface. The area was sealed off using local materials and the site was left.
2.7 The Sudanese Red Crescent (SRC) operates an office in the Kassala teaching hospital.
Meanwhile, at 1000hrs, on the morning of 14 August 2010, the Kassala sub-office received a
phone call from the (SRC) that a mine accident has taken place and one man had been
injured. This was the first time that UNMAO had heard of this accident. The National QA
officer verbally gave the information to Regional office that the area where the accident had
taken place was outside the [Demining group] cleared area.
2.8 On the 15 August 2010, the sub-office sent the National Operations Officer, National QA
Officer and the NMAC QA officer to the site to complete IMSMA DA, victim, and mine field
accident reports. During this visit the team observed the second AT mine PRB 35 been found
by the military, both mines were taken away by the military and destroyed at a safe distance.
Analysis.
2.9 After reviewing the site documentation, it is clear that both [Demining group] and the sub-
office had not managed the team well. [Demining group] documentation presented to the
board is inaccurate, with vital elements missing such as the site map and visitors log. A closer
look at the daily diaries indicates that excessive metres had been cleared by the deminers in
one day, while the total of the metres for a days work had been reduced and added to next
days work. (QC) was not conducted on a daily basis, with almost one month passing without
any internal quality assurance recorded. Daily deminers metres were not recorded on
occasions. Attendance records show no medics on site during the completion day. The
completion report is not correctly completed, no photos of reference points, distances are
excessive between turning points in violation to NTSGs, the detail map of the completion is
very poor with no details other than a shaded box, start point is not on the start line. No
permanent fixed bench mark recorded.
2.10 The management of the mine field from the Sub office lacked professional Quality
Assurance (QA) and documentation checking through out the mine field clearance. Excessive
clearance rates are clearly seen on days when no internal QC has been recorded. Clearance
rates have not been fully reported with reduction in meters that are added to the next days
work. The total number of external QA conducted does not comply with Annex A of Chapter
14 in the National Technical Standards Guidelines (NTSGs). The QA of the completion is not
as required with distances, bearings and mapping not to the standard that is expected in
NRMAO.
2.11 During the joint detailed investigation and visit to the accident site shortly after the
accident, safety was compromised by [Demining group], NMAC, and UNMAO by allowing
there own personnel to enter the hazard area, without having first established a clear route to
the site of detonation as seen by the photos used in the [Demining group] report and DA
report attached. Had the sub office visited the site more often they would have been able to
identify the area where the detonation had taken place, failing to check the clearance
completion report led to a delay, in establishing the location of the accident site and
confirming whether it had occurred in a cleared area.
62.12 Whilst the regional data base was used to cross check the accident coordinates they
wrongly checked against the survey completion report, which only compounded things, the
clearance completion report should have been used. There was a 212 meters error between
the bench marks, when a printed comparison map was produced this showed two separate
mine fields with the same shape but apart by the error margin. Regional Office took the right
decision to confirm on the ground with the joint team to identify once and for all the exact
location of the detonation.
3. Location of the Accident/Incident
3.1 The area lies 30 kilometers to the southeast of Kassala and runs along the border with
Eritrea. The ground is of a sandy light soil nature and there are areas of thick bush scattered
within it. During the rainy season it is subjected to flooding. The actual site was a former
military camp during the civil unrest close to the Eritrea border.
3.2 During the BOI site visit the area had been cultivated. It was reported that the first time a
tractor had been used in the cultivation process took place last year, after the clearance had
been completed. In the Kassala area it is customary to plough, in the direction of north-south
first, then to plough east-west, to break up the ground facilitating the hand planting of onions.
An impact survey was carried out in the area in April 2007 by [Demining group], which
generated SHA NR 35, and later was assigned DA number NR 1033. The [Demining group]
survey Team identified two mine fields during the survey. The Survey team, MTT 1, was using
hand clearance drills with Ebinger GC 421 detectors. The DA was closed and two mine fields
were issued, NR 204 and NR 205. These in turn were tasked to [Demining group] for
clearance under the task number NR 709.
3.3 The clearance started on NR 204 and NR 205 on 12 April 2009 until 23 July 2009.
The Clearance team MTT5 was conducting hand clearance drills with Mine lab F3 detectors.
The task was subjected to very few external and internal QA visits, during these QA visits no
adverse comments recorded.
3.4 After the completion in July 2009 the area was released back to the local authorities.
Local farmers began to cultivate the area with onions. Last year in the same area were the
accident occurred the area was ploughed with no incident.
3.5 The area lies very close to a border crossing point with Eritrea. A new road has been built
to facilitate traffic moving in and out of Ethiopia. The clearance of the mine field is now a high
priority as the area is heavily populated with local farmers.
3.6 GPS readings of the detonation site and the areas where the two other mines were
located were taken during the [Demining group] investigation, the GPS readings could not be
confirmed by the BOI team, due to the lack of a safe lane to these areas, instead, the BOI
observed the site from a known safe area.
3.7 The [Demining group] investigation recorded the following coordinates:
[Demining group] GPS reading of the explosion site: N151254.6 E362908.9
4. Casualties
4.1 One casualty occurred in this accident, Mr [Name removed] who suffered major injuries to
his upper right arm and lower right leg. He received immediate medical treatment and has
been referred to a Khartoum hospital for further treatment.
The BOI interviewed the list of witnesses provided below.
[Names of witness removed.]
76. Details of Activities on the Day of the Accident
6.1 No demining activities were been conducted in that area on the day of the accident.
7. Details of the Mine/UXO involved
7.1 Please see Annex D [Not made available.]
8. Evidence of Re-mining
8.1 There is no evidence of re-mining. The two other mines located by the military engineers
were reported as deeply buried, given the area had been ploughed twice this would explain
why the mines were deeper that the normal depth. The clearance team now re-clearing the
site has reported finding one AT and one AP mine around the tractor, the AT mine was in line
with the other two located by the military engineers shortly after the accident.
9. Particulars of Insurance
9.1 Not applicable because casualty is not conducting a demining activity or part of demining
operations. He may have individual health insurance but this was not confirmed.
10. Within the [Demining group] Task dossier, none of the following documentation was
located:
a. No Survey Reports
b. No Records of internal quality assurance being carried out during the period of
29/06/2009 to 22/07/2009.
c. Form T carried out (Prep & Set-up) front page not completed;
d. No Documents to support the two CASEVAC Drills carried out (02 & 09/10/2009);
e. Details of ordnance destroyed or what explosive/accessories utilized (30/06/2009);
f. No pictures of RP, BM
g. No separate visitor’s log, or safety brief.
h. No casevac Plan.
i. No communication Plan.
j. No separate team Nominal rolls with blood groups ID card numbers etc, details not
entered on the daily diaries.
k. No site map.
A full list is of other missing documentation, including completion details is listed with
explanations at Annex J. [See Related papers.]
11. Conclusion
[Demining group]
11.1 [Demining group]’s own detailed investigation report confirmed that the area where the
accident occurred and the two other mines were found, were indeed inside the cleared DA..
The BOI also concludes this.
11.2 The documentation presented by [Demining group] for the task had vital parts missing,
there was no site map presented to the board. [Demining group]’s, on site daily diaries were
not filled in correctly. The completion report is inaccurate with the number of items found not
matching the items destroyed, distances between the turning points not in line with NTSGs
the completion map lacking detail.
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identified clearance speeds, the on-site documentation should have been corrected by
[Demining group] Technical Field Managers(TFM) Team Leaders(T/L) Furthermore, the
National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) mine field report recorded a large number of mines but
only part of those mines were found by [Demining group]. Nothing was done to investigate
where the missing mines were.
UNMAO Sub Office
11.4 External QA was not conducted as per NTSG. External QA would have identified the
grave lacking in the on site documentation, and picked up the lack of QC from [Demining
group], Clearance rates clearly indicate in (Annex J) that the team was rushing the clearance
of the mines along the4 mine row.
11.5 The completion report was lacking in detail, yet was accepted by the Sub Office and
signed off as completed by both the QA and Operations officers in Kassala (Annex B.) QA
Officers at the time of completion was Mr [Name removed, QA Officer, Mr [Name removed]
Operations Officer.
11.6 The Sub Office needs to review their QA visits and to create a schedule to visit all mine
fields and ensure that all mine fields are visited in compliance with NTSGs.
11.7 During the investigation of the accident NRMAO data base check, the grid location was
checked against the completion report of the Survey team. This was an error. If the clearance
completion report had been used it would have established that the grid location was indeed
inside the [Demining group] reported cleared area, the error in cross checking delayed the
final out come.
11.8 During the accident investigation by the sub office visits, both, [Demining group], NMAC
and the Sub Offices allowed their members to enter into the dangerous area, without
establishing a safe cleared lane to the site of the detonation. Currently [Another demining
group] are re-clearing the site and have located to date, two other mines one AP (PRB 35)
and one AT (PRB 35) A closer look at the photos taken by these individuals clearly shows
that it very fortunate that no other person was injured
11.9 The detector trial conducted on the Mine Lab F3 and the Ebinger 421 GC has high
lighted that the Ebinger 421 GC will not detect PRB35 AT mine at the required clearance
depth. All companies must be warned and a review taken by HQ UNMAO in relation to
allowing this detector to be used in country against these mines.
12. Recommendations
[Demining group]
12.1. Greater supervision and/or training are provided to ensure that the basic levels of
record-keeping and completion documentation are maintained in the future. The relevant
documents should be able to relate to task/ground to the reader; it should be possible to
accurately cross-reference data.
12.2. The following documentation is added the [Demining group] SOPs: Visitors Log,
Detector running log, Stores & Equipment Register, CDS Standing Orders, Demolition Plans
& Demolition Safety Briefs if utilizing a CDS. These items would allow cross checking of
information form the completion reports and [Demining group] own daily diaries.
.12.3 To comply with NTSGs, Internal QA should be conducted by [Demining group], which
must submit the required number of QA forms relevant to the task once a month.
912.4. Internal training should be conducted with all team leaders TFMs in the arts of finishing
Completion reports as laid out in the NTSGs Sudan.
12.5. Missed mines drills to be increased to a five meter box around any area where a mine is
not found in a mine row. [Demining group] SOPS to be amended.
12.6. [Demining group] reverts to completing the UNMAO daily report not the weekly progress
report. NRMAO/ Sub office Kassala
12.6 (NMAC UNMAO Offices Kassala should carry out a review of all QA practices. If training
is needed, support should be given.
12.7 The UNMAO sub-office should carry out a review of all contractors on site task
documentation in relation to quality of recording.
12.8 Kassala Operations Officers to assist QA by conducting external QA.
12.9 NRMAO when cross checking accident, incidents grid locations should ensure that the
most updated and latest completion report is used.
12.10 Care must be taken when providing photos of a location where accidents have taken
place, coordinates must be provided as not to confuse reference points against the accident
location.
12.11 The detector trial conducted on the Mine Lab F3 and the Ebinger 421 GC has high
lighted that the Ebinger 421 GC will not detect PRB35 AT mine at the required clearance
depth. All companies must be warned and a review taken by HQ UNMAO in relation to
allowing this detector to be used in country against these mines.
12.12 UNMAO to issue an immediate safety notice to all contractors and sub office’s on the
requirements of creating a safe working lane to site of the accident/ detonation before any
movement is allowed in the area of the detonation.
12.13 UNMAO should consider that the clearance depth is only 13 cm, a normal plough will
normally plough a furrow of around 30 cm deep, should the clearance depth be increased in
areas were ploughing is expected or consider that all areas were AT mines are present that
only mechanical assets should be used.
[Signed by the Chairman and all BOI members.]
Victim Report
Victim number: 995 Name: [Name removed]
Age: Gender: Male
Status: civilian Fit for work: not known
Compensation: Not known Time to hospital: Not recorded.
Protection issued: None Protection used: None
Summary of injuries: severe Arm; severe Leg
COMMENT: No medical report was made available.
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Related papers
A report into the Demining Group’s clearance of the area [Presumed to be an Annex] was
made available. Conducted for UNMAO, it involves the examination of all available records.
This report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.
October 5, 2010
BOI UNMAO Sub-Office Kassala 04 - 06/10/2010
Instructions from BOI Chairman:
1. Check all External & Internal QA Forms in Completion Folder.
2. Check Completion Report for errors.
3. Check Completion Folder for errors.
4. Check & compile map & results to present to BOI members.
1. External & Internal QA Reports carried out at Al Lafia, M/F ID NR-205:
The following External & Internal QA's were carried out at Al Lafia over the period June 1 -
July 23, 2009:
External QA:
Date UNMAO QA
Form
Grade [Demining
group]
Time Remarks
01/06/09 [Name
removed 1]
J Medium [Name
removed 2]
1045 -
1200
1st day of work
25/06/09 [Name
removed 1]
J Medium [Name
removed 2]
1145 -
1350
DD states QA Officer
off site @ 1350, DD
states 1320hrs
30/06/09 [Name
removed 1]
F
J
Medium
High
[Name
removed 2]
1255 -
1400
0950 -
1230
What was destroyed
No detector test
07/07/09 [Name
removed 1]
J Medium [Name
removed 2]
0910 -
1145
No detector test
23/07/09 [Name
removed 1]
E High [Name
removed 2]
1005 -
1120
No Benchmark &
different GPS*
Internal QA:
Date UNMAO QA
Form
Grade [Demining group] Time Remarks
11/06/09 N Medium [Name removed 2]
[Name removed 3]
0905 -
1135
14/06/09 J Medium [Name removed 2]
[Name removed 3]
1000 -
1130
No detector test
16/06/09 L Medium [Name removed 2]
[Name removed 3]
1000 -
1115
No HLS details
20/06/09 J Medium [Name removed 2]
[Name removed 3]
0955 -
1120
28/06/09 L1 Medium [Name removed 4]
[Name removed 2]
0800 -
0948
Front page
incomplete
23/07/09 E High [Name removed 5]
[Name removed 2]
?? No timings
Different GPS*
* Different GPS reading utilised for the same location.
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NB:
a. No Form T carried out (Prep & Set-up);
b. No paperwork to support the two CASEVAC Drills carried out (02 &
09/10/2009);
c. No detail of ordnance destroyed or what explosive/accessories utilised
(30/06/2009);
d. Front page of Form L1 incomplete;
e. No record of Internal QA being carried out over the period 29/06 - 22/07/2009.
2. Completion Report errors:
The Completion Report was checked thoroughly and the following errors were found:
a. No pictures/details of RP and/or Benchmark (BM);
b. Size of area is different to the totals contained within the Daily Diaries;
c. Mines located differ from totals in contained within the Daily Diaries;
d. The Completion Map is missing the following details:
(1) North arrow;
(2) Legend;
(3) Mine-row(s) (site map which is missing);
(4) BM;
e. Distances between SP to TP & TPs to TPs too great; (TP1 - TP2 = 224.7m, 50m max);
f. Date of completion on CR (25/07/2009) different to that on Handover Certificate
(23/07/2009).
NB: It has been mentioned that the large Tondob tree in the centre of the old Military Camp
was the BM but it is also listed as the Reference Point. The SP should be clearly visible from
the RP/BM and is to consist of three metal pickets driven flush to the ground. In addition the
SP should be located adjacent to the Start Line where clearance activities begin (in this
instance the SP was 208m away from the Start Lane).
IPs and/or TPs should be inserted when either the difference in bearing is 2 degrees or
greater and/or a maximum of 50m apart.
3. Completion Folder errors:
The Completion Folder was checked and the following errors were found:
a. No Visitor Brief/Safety Brief;
b. CASEVAC Plan;
c. No Communications Plan;
d. Number of A/T & A/P mines located as listed in the Daily Diaries (258) differ from the totals
inserted in the Completion Report & Handover Certificate (267);
e. Number of SM20 & Electric Detonators utilised during demolitions differ from the Daily
Diaries (SM20 x 178 & Elec Det x 172) to the Explosive Register (SM20 x 283 & Electric
Detonators x 299);
12
f. No Team Nominal Roll c/w relevant details (Blood Group, ID Card No, etc, etc);
g. No Site Map;
h. No Internal or External QA Form T (Prep & Set-up) carried out;
i. No paperwork to support the two CASEVAC Drills carried out (02 & 09/06/2009);
j. No demolition paperwork to verify ordnance destroyed and location;
The following table highlights the errors in the Daily Diaries:
Date Cleared m2 QCm2 Remarks
01/06/2009 137 25 Arrive on site @ 0900 & working @ 0915hrs
02/06/2009 338 112
03/06/2009 431 195
04/06/2009 396 176
05/06/2009 293 134 DD stop work @ 1325 & CL @ 1100hrs
06/06/2009 377 158
07/06/2009 90 0 Nil Internal QC
08/06/2009 616 175 DD stop work @ 1320 & CL @ 1300hrs
09/06/2009 491 63 CASEVAC @ 1018hrs (8mins) - CL stated visitor to CP
to carryout QA but no QA carried out & no details of
visitor in DD.
10/06/2009 292 80
11/06/2009 285 165 DD stop work @ 1350 & CL @ 1320hrs
12/06/2009 279 50 DD stop work @ 1300 & CL @ 1100hrs
13/06/2009 439 65
14/06/2009 410 55
15/06/2009 455 100
16/06/2009 469 70
17/06/2009 425 90
18/06/2009 314 55
19/06/2009 301 50 BIS - No record in Explosive Register
CL - Dems @ 1105hrs yet deminers still in M/F
20/06/2009 350 50
21/06/2009 320 55
25/06/2009 504 156 DD stop work @ 1540 & CL @ 1520hrs
No record or time of dems
26/06/2009 575 120
27/06/2009 663 325 Dems @ 1339hrs - No record in Explosive Register
28/06/2009 661 237 No m2 entered in page 2 of DD but the m2 on page 1
was reduced by 200m2, why?
No Internal QC carried out
29/06/2009 783 320 No Internal QC carried out
30/06/2009 532 150
01/07/2009 731 215 M2 cleared was reduced by 100m2, why?
02/07/2009 923 0 M2 cleared was reduced by 100m2, why?
No Internal QC carried out
03/07/2009 667 130 M2 cleared was increased by 100m2, why?
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No CL
04/07/2009 660 100 M2 cleared was increased by 100m2, why?
05/07/2009 631 125
06/07/2009 863 0 M2 cleared was reduced by 100m2, why?
07/07/2009 657 135
08/07/2009 913 260
09/07/2009 952 315
10/07/2009 801 230
11/07/2009 908 240
16/07/2009 924 362
17/07/2009 889 175 DD incomplete (other information)
18/07/2009 1,050 235
20/07/2009 382 95 382m2 shown in summary yet 689m2 shown on page 1
DD incomplete (other information)
21/07/2009 724 0 No shift details and no Internal QC carried out
22/07/2009 1,073 0 No shift details and no Internal QC carried out
24,974 5,798
DD - Daily Diary
CL - Communication Log
BIS - Blow-in-situ
The following table highlights the errors in the explosive & accessories register and/or Daily
Diaries:
Date Explosive Register Daily Diary Remarks
SM20 Elec Det SM20 Elec Det
17/06/2009 20 25 N/A N/A Issued to [Identifer
removed] 1
19/06/2009 NR NR 2 2
25/06/2009 NR NR 2 2
27/06/2009 NR NR 3 3
28/06/2009 6 6 6 6
29/06/2009 14 14 12 12
30/06/2009 13 13 8 8
01/07/2009 10 10 9 9
02/07/2009 20 24 17 17
03/07/2009 13 13 10 10
04/07/2009 19 19 11 11
05/07/2009 16 17 7 7
06/07/2009 18 22 10 16
07/07/2009 20 20 13 13
08/07/2009 12 12 5 5
09/07/2009 19 19 8 8
10/07/2009 1 1 0 0
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11/07/2009 26 24 10 10
16/07/2009 13 13 8 8
17/07/2009 14 14 10 10
18/07/2009 17 17 10 10
19/07/2009 12 12 NR NR
20/07/2009 NR NR 10 10
21/07/2009 0 4 NR NR
Totals: 283 299 178 172
NR - No record in Explosive Register and/or Daily Diary.
The following table highlights the errors in the accounting for A/P & A/T mines located:
Date Cleared m2 QCm2 PRB-M3 A/T PRB-M35 A/P No 4 A/P
01/06/2009 137 25
02/06/2009 338 112
03/06/2009 431 195
04/06/2009 396 176
05/06/2009 293 134
06/06/2009 377 158
07/06/2009 90 0
08/06/2009 616 175
09/06/2009 491 63
10/06/2009 292 80
11/06/2009 285 165
12/06/2009 279 50
13/06/2009 439 65
14/06/2009 410 55
15/06/2009 455 100
16/06/2009 469 70
17/06/2009 425 90
18/06/2009 314 55
19/06/2009 301 50 0 0 1
20/06/2009 350 50 0 0 0
21/06/2009 320 55 0 0 0
25/06/2009 504 156 1 0 2
26/06/2009 575 120 1 0 0
27/06/2009 663 325 4 0 3
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28/06/2009 661 237 3 0 4
29/06/2009 783 320 4 1 11
30/06/2009 532 150 5 1 6
01/07/2009 731 215 6 0 9
02/07/2009 923 0 7 3 11
03/07/2009 667 130 4 2 8
04/07/2009 660 100 10 3 8
05/07/2009 631 125 7 4 3
06/07/2009 863 0 7 3 7
07/07/2009 657 135 8 8 5
08/07/2009 913 260 3 3 2
09/07/2009 952 315 4 5 3
10/07/2009 801 230 1 0 0
11/07/2009 908 240 5 3 7
16/07/2009 924 362 2 5 3
17/07/2009 889 175 4 4 6
18/07/2009 1,050 235 4 4 5
20/07/2009 382 95 5 0 10
21/07/2009 724 0 0 0 0
22/07/2009 1,073 0 0 0 0
24,974 5,798 95 (98) 49 (52) 114 (117)
Total A/T mines 95 Total A/P mines 163
() Figures in brackets have been obtained from the CR, other figures from Daily Diary.
In many of the cases the communication log time for mine(s) found differs greatly from the
Daily Diary.
Other issues:
1. No medic on site on July 23, 2009 for QA Completion;
2. No Form G (Explosive Storage) carried out (not a requirement but suggested);
3. Deminers, once mine row(s) were located, increased their daily output from approx 44m2 to
75m2 (chasing mines?). In addition the metal count decreased from an average of 200+/day
to 16/day (eventually metal items were not recorded at all);
4. There is no record of whether the mines were located on the surface or sub-surface or a
combination of both;
5. On June 7, 2009 the Team worked in protest (only 90m2 cleared this day); what was the
protest and was this resolved to the satisfaction of the individuals concerned?;
6. On four occasions m2 cleared was either reduced or increased by 100m2 from what the
deminers actually cleared; how was this annotated on the site map for QC purposes?
7. On June 28, 2009 the reported figure was reduced by 200m2.
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8. On July 9,2009 the reported figure was reduced by 300m2 and one deminer cleared 580m2.
On July 20, 2009 the reported figure was increased by 300m2.
4. Mapping:
All folders relating to NR-205 do not contain any site mapping. The only map available is in
the CR (Trackmaker) and this is inadequate.
There is, unless the original maps are located, no possible way for the BOI Team to obtain
the following information:
1. Number of mine row(s);
2. Location of mine-row(s);
3. Location of clearance lanes to deminer(s);
4. Location of daily Internal QC;
5. Daily Start location for each deminer (shift change if applicable);
6. Location of CDS, Firing Point & UXO Pit;
7. Which mines were BIS and/or removed after RSP;
8. Location of Survey Lanes;
9. Was a CDS utilised in the first instance.
NB: A suggested minimum requirements for a 'Trackmaker' map is shown on Page 8.
5. Recommendation & Conclusions:
It is recommended that greater supervision and/or training is provided to ensure that the basic
levels of record keeping are maintained in the future. The relevant documents should be able
to relate to task/ground to the reader; however this is not the case. In addition, it should be
possible to accurately cross-reference data.
Suggested documents:
1. Visitors Log;
2. CR should provide sufficient information such as average mine depth, surface
laid, sub-surface laid or combination of both. In addition it should be highlighted
whether mines were BIS and/or removed to a CDS for destruction.
3. Detector running log;
4. Stores & Equipment Register;
5. CDS Standing Orders, Demolition Plans & Demolition Safety Briefs if utilising
a CDS.
Due to the inaccurate record keeping and some missing documentation it is felt that no
conclusion regarding the missed mines can be provided. It is further noted that the
Completion Report and Folder should not have been accepted by UNMAO Sub-Office
Kassala prior to the Handover Certificate being signed.
Stringent custodian procedures should be put in place to prevent important documents, in this
case the site map, from being mislaid. It is near impossible for the BOI Members to confirm
whether actions such as demolitions, destruction of all mines located have been completed
and where the mine-row(s) were located without this vital information being available in the
Completion Report and/or Folder.
(Name removed)
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Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because it seems
that the field controllers allowed deminers to work at impossible rates and that the mines may
have been missed because the area in question was simply not searched. The secondary
cause is listed as a Management Control Inadequacy because the demining group involved is
one of the best known NGOs in demining with extensive experience yet they failed to keep
basic records of work conducted and did not ensure that an elementary quality management
regime was in place. It seems that they also failed to conduct rudimentary checks on their
detector’s ability to detect the mines anticipated in the area.
The clearance by the military immediately after the accident involved the use of prodders
which found AT mines but which could have caused severe injury has they prodded onto AP
mines. More mines were found when the area was professionally cleared by a demining
group tasked by the UNMAO, providing an example of the fact that prodding is unlikely to lead
to the discovery of all mines.
The UNMAO investigators are to be commended for recognizing significant management
control errors stemming from the lack of QM applied by their regional office to the work of the
demining group involved. However, no individuals are directly criticized and no disciplinary
action recommended, so it is not clear whether any improvements were made. That said, this
is the best UN accident report seen for some years.
